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2Introduction
The last two decades have been marked by an increasing occurrence of nancial instability
episodes. These have often resulted in macroeconomic turmoil, both in industrialized economies
and emerging markets. The signicance of real costs of nancial instability emphasizes the need
to explore the link between nancial volatility and the real economy. Through its inuence on
the cost for external nance, the banking sector plays a prominent role in the monetary policy
transmission mechanism, determining the amplitude of monetary policy innovations on prices
and on rmsprotability. Therefore, it is of crucial importance to account for the e¤ects of
bank lending on production, ination and asset prices. This leads to two central questions:
rstly, should the monetary authority respond to asset prices to enhance nancial stability and
to rule out possible multiple equilibria? Secondly, does the answer to this question depend on
whether nancial frictions and the banking sector are properly taken into account?
We address these questions within a New Keynesian (NK) framework featuring the existence
of a cost channel e¤ect, where rmsmarginal cost directly depends on the nominal rate of in-
terest. In recent years, a growing body of cross-country evidence has stressed the relevance of
the cost of external nance for pricing decisions of rms. The literature on the cost channel of
monetary policy transmission mechanism has placed particular emphasis on the role of supply-
side e¤ects for ination dynamics. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and
Schabert (2006) explore the cost channel in a model with nominal rigidities. They show that
the traditional output-ination trade-o¤ can be signicantly modied, as the cost channel sub-
stantially alters the transmission of monetary policy. Despite the increasing emphasis placed on
nancial frictions as an amplication mechanism of macroeconomic uctuations (see Bernanke
and Gertler, 1989), the e¤ect of the cost channel on rmsprotability and on asset prices has
generally been neglected by the literature exploring the normative aspects of monetary policy.
Supply-side e¤ects exerted by nominal interest rates can be interpreted as a direct conse-
quence of capital market imperfections, namely asymmetric information giving rise to agency
problems between rms and lenders. The magnitude of monetary policy supply-side e¤ects not
only relates to rmsdependence on external funds but also on the pass-through from policy to
bank lending rates. This aspect is central to our analysis. Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and Schabert
(2006) show that heterogeneous nancial systems can lead to major di¤erences in the transmis-
sion of policy shocks. In the perspective of designing the architecture of an optimal currency
area, convergence of nancial systems seems to be an important prerequisite for a successful
common monetary policy. These considerations turn out to be particularly relevant for the
European Monetary Union (EMU), where a single monetary authority inuences heterogeneous
credit markets.
The present work builds on the theoretical literature on fragility and instability fostered by
imperfect nancial markets. These studies have often produced models of interaction between
nancial and goods markets. As detailed in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 1993), Bernanke
and Gertler (1989, 1990) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), nancing constraints can be relevant
to both investment and production decisions. In our framework, rms are committed to pay
3the wage bill before production takes place and prots are realized. Although rms could
alternatively issue new equity, this possibility is a priori excluded. In fact, due to adverse
selection phenomena, new equity issues would be too costly. Therefore, rms have to resort to
the credit market. Asymmetric information only characterizes the equity market, whereas the
banking sector is assumed to have perfect information.
We study the performance of interest rate rules responding to (current or expected) ination,
output gap and asset prices misalignments from their frictionless level when the cost channel
matters. We tackle the problem from the vantage of rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
uniqueness and stability under adaptive learning. As a matter of fact, Brückner and Schabert
(2003) and Llosa and Tuesta (2007) show that the cost channel signicantly modies standard
conditions for determinacy and learnability within the context of a NK model. However, they
only consider a one-to-one relationship between the monetary instrument and the bank-lending
rate.
This study considers the entire range of pass-through from policy to bank lending rates.
We provide an analytical assessment of the conditions for determinacy and E-stability under
an interest rate rule that responds only to ination. In this case, we provide critical values of
the degree of pass-through that signicantly alter the standard properties of the NK model in
terms of equilibrium uniqueness and expectational stability. As it is well known, interest rate
rules usually ensure a unique equilibrium if they fulll the so-called Taylor principle. We show
that this condition is no longer su¢ cient to ensure determinacy when the cost channel matters,
as we identify a set of stricter conditions that bound the response to the rate of ination from
above. Given that the nominal rate of interest has a direct e¤ect on ination, these constraints
prevent the central bank from being too reactive to inationary pressures. Moreover, we show
that considering a one-to-one relationship from policy to bank lending rates, as in Ravenna
and Walsh (2006), can be quite misleading for the design of monetary policy. Conversely, a
careful assessment of the degree of pass-through is necessary to understand the magnitude of
supply-side e¤ects.
Numerical simulations show that the area of determinacy and E-stability considerably de-
creases in the degree of pass-through. We argue that, under strong credit market distortions,
the monetary policy authority should be cautious when designing its policy. A response to
either output gap or asset prices is desirable under these circumstances, as this reduces the
area of indeterminacy and E-instability. When we compare the two alternatives we observe
that in some cases a response to asset prices might be even more attractive than responding to
the output gap, as a smaller reaction coe¢ cient is required to drive the system in the area of
determinacy.
Moreover, under uncertainty regarding the degree of pass-through between policy and bank
lending rates, we suggest that the central bank is better o¤ following a rule in which the policy
instrument is set according to misalignments in contemporaneous data rather than adopting
forward looking interest rate rules. In the former case a considerably wider area of determinacy
and a lower welfare loss is achieved for a plausible range of responses to ination and output
gap. Furthermore, responding to asset prices is always benecial, from a welfare point of view,
4when the central bank considers a term reecting stock price volatility in the loss function.
Our results point out that responding to asset prices misalignments might be benecial
when strong credit market distortions are detected. This strategy generally allows us to ensure
equilibrium uniqueness and learnability. Due to a direct e¤ect induced by interest rate move-
ments on rms protability, these results stand in contrast with previous studies exploring
the opportunity to stabilize asset prices in the presence of nominal rigidities. As a matter of
fact, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) show that the central bank can inadvertently introduce real
indeterminacy into the economy by responding positively to asset prices misalignments. They
suggest that this is due to the inverse relationship between marginal costs and dividends that
classically arises in a sticky price environment. In our case, the interest rate directly a¤ects
rmsprotability and, in turn, asset prices. When the cost channel matters, the policy instru-
ment a¤ects positively the marginal cost, hence a monetary innovation exerts a direct inuence
on ination dynamics in the same direction. At the same time, inationary pressures are scaled
down if the central bank responds positively to asset prices, as this translates into a negative
response to the output gap that balances the cost channel e¤ect.
The remainder of the paper reads as follows: Section 1 reviews some relevant literature;
Section 2 introduces the theoretical setting; Section 3 draws some policy implications in a
frictionless environment; Section 4 assesses the conditions for determinacy and E-stability under
di¤erent interest rate rules; Section 5 concludes.
1. Literature Review
In principle, the cost channel has been advanced as a possible explanation of a positive reaction
of the price level to contractionary monetary policy observed in several empirical studies. Sims
(1992) was the rst to point out this unexpected nding for the United States, readily labelled
by Eichenbaum (1992) as the price puzzle. Numerous studies have focused on the role of the
cost channel for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, both from an empirical and
a theoretical perspective. Barth and Ramey (2000) provide evidence in support of the cost
channel in industry-level longitudinal data, whereas Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997)
incorporate the cost channel into an aggregate structural model. Compared to previous studies
that primarily focus on banks operating in a frictionless credit market (see, e.g., Ravenna
and Walsh, 2006), Hülsewig, Mayer, and Wollmershäuser (2006) assess the cost channel from
a di¤erent perspective. They conjecture that banks determine their loan supply in light of
expectations about the future course of monetary policy. This framework implies that the
adjustment of loan rates to a monetary policy shock is sticky. Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and
Schabert (2006) estimate di¤erent Phillips curves that account for direct interest rate e¤ects.
They show that changes in short-run nominal interest rates have a substantial direct e¤ect on
ination dynamics in the majority of developed countries. Their structural model reveals that
the cost channel can substantially dampen ination responses, and is even able to account for
inverse ination reactions, which can be related to the price puzzle. Thus, their analysis points
at signicant direct interest rate e¤ects on short-run ination dynamics, indicating that the cost
channel is non-negligible for the assessment of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
5Nonetheless, the existing literature on the cost channel does not explore the e¤ect of rms
reliance on external nance on their protability and, in turn, on stock price dynamics. Our
paper addresses this issue and evaluates the opportunity for the monetary authority to respond
to asset prices misalignments when the cost channel matters. A long-standing debate concerning
the role and scope of central banks in stabilizing asset prices has arisen from the contributions of
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001), where nancial frictions give rise to a nancial accelerator
mechanism that magnies the e¤ects of both exogenous and policy shocks. In their sticky price
framework a shock to asset prices increases aggregate demand, hence driving up the price level.
Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) conclude that there is no need for a direct response to asset
prices, as a central bank that responds to general price ination is implicitly responding to
asset price movements. They argue in favor of a monetary policy that does not respond to asset
prices, except insofar as they signal changes in expected ination. Bullard and Schaling (2002)
show that adding equity prices to the Taylor rule generally does not improve the economic
performance, and might possibly harm both real and nancial stability.1 Conversely, Genberg,
Lipsky, Cecchetti, and Wadhwani (2000) follow the modelling strategy of Bernanke and Gertler
(1999, 2001), and argue that central banks should respond to asset prices to stabilize the
economy and to prevent from the rise of bubbles.2 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) emphasize
the link between protability and output gap in a sticky price environment. They show how a
central bank trying to avoid bubbles can inadvertently introduce non-fundamental movements
into both asset prices and real activity by reacting to asset prices misalignments. It is a well-
established fact that in sticky price models marginal costs are proportional to the output gap.
An interest rate rule that responds positively to (expected or current) values of stock prices
is a rule that responds positively to dividends. This creates a potential problem from the
perspective of equilibrium determinacy. Nisticò (2006) and Airaudo, Nisticò, and Zanna (2006)
analyze the role of stock prices for monetary policy design in a small structural model with
stock-wealth e¤ects. They nd that adopting an instrument rule that responds to the stock-
price gap incurs risks of endogenous instability that depend on the average price markup in the
economy, while reacting to the stock-price growth can achieve substantial stability gains. Faia
and Monacelli (2007) study optimal Taylor-type interest rate rules in an economy with credit
market imperfections. In their sticky price framework, a countercyclical premium on external
nance is generated through a bankruptcy mechanism. They nd that monetary policy should
lower interest rates in the face of positive misalignments of asset prices from their equilibrium
level. Nevertheless, when the monetary authority is strenuously committed to stabilize ination,
responding to asset prices does not bring any benet from a welfare point of view. Gilchrist and
Saito (2006) reinforce previous results that a policy responding strongly to ination, in absence
of nancial frictions, is su¢ cient. Adding asset prices to the set of intermediate targets does
not lead to further benets. Yet, none of these studies considers the opportunity of responding
1Nevertheless, they implement an arbitrage condition where the dividend process is not modelled as a function
of the prots.
2Bernanke and Gertler (2001) comment on these results claiming that, although the models used are similar,
Genberg, Lipsky, Cecchetti, and Wadhwani (2000) assume that the policymaker knows with certainty the stock
price process and, most importantly, when the bubble is going to burst.
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are explicitly taken into account. As a matter of fact, most of the studies that argue against an
explicit response to asset prices misalignments, generally disregard the importance of the joint
direct e¤ect of the cost of working capital on rmspricing process and on their protability.
They mainly focus on the role of wealth e¤ects channeled through the demand side.
2. The Model
2.1. Demand Side. The model economy is populated by households, rms, and nancial
intermediaries operating on the markets for consumption goods, labor, assets and bonds. The
goods market is characterized by monopolistic competition, and the adjustment of prices follows
the standard treatment based on Calvo (1983). Derivations of the basic NK model can be found
in Woodford (2003) and Walsh (2003). Preferences of the representative household are dened
over a composite consumption good, Ct and leisure, 1 Nt. Households maximize the expected
present discounted value of their utility:
Et
1X
i=0
i
"
Ht+iC
1 
t+i
1    
N1+t+i
1 + 
#
; (1)
where  is the intertemporal discount factor and Ht = exp(ht) is a taste shock.3 Parameter 
denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, while  is the inverse of the
elasticity of substitution between work and leisure. Consumption, Ct, is a Dixit-Stiglitz bundle
composed of a continuum of di¤erentiated goods:
Ct =
Z 1
0
(Cjt)
1  1
t dj
 t
t 1
; (2)
where Cjt is the consumption of the good produced by rm j. Following Steinsson (2003),
Ireland (2004) and Airaudo, Nisticò, and Zanna (2006), we assume that the elasticity of sub-
stitution in demand (t) follows a log-stationary stochastic process. This translates into a
cost-push shock, which raises a non-trivial trade-o¤ between ination and output gap stabiliza-
tion (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999, Result 1 ). Given prices Pjt for the jth good, households
demand for good j and the aggregate price index Pt read as follows:
Cjt =

Pjt
Pt
 t
Ct; (3)
Pt =
Z 1
0
(Pjt)
1 t dj
 1
1 t
: (4)
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007), we assume that households, whose labor supply
is compensated at the real wage Wt, enter period t with cash holdings Mt, Bt 1 one-period
nominal bonds that pay Rt 1 gross interest (1+ it 1), and At 1 shares of stock that sell at price
3A taste shock is introduced to account for the competing e¤ects of supply and demand side innovations on
the frictionless state of the economy.
7Qt and pay dividend Dt. Before households enter the goods market, they deposit funds Mdt
at nancial intermediaries, which in turn remunerate them at the gross interest Rdt (= 1 + i
d
t ).
Consumption expenditures are restricted by the following liquidity constraint:
PtCt Mt  Mdt + PtWtNt: (5)
The intertemporal budget constraint can be specied as:
PtCt+PtQtAt+Bt+Mt+1+M
d
t Mt+Rt 1Bt 1+PtAtDt+RdtMdt +PtQtAt 1+PtWtNt: (6)
Thus, optimization conditions include the following:
Nt
HtC
 
t
=Wt; (7)
HtC
 
t = Et
 
RtHt+1C
 
t+1
1 + t+1
!
; (8)
HtC
 
t (Qt  Dt) = Et
 
Ht+1C
 
t+1Qt+1

; (9)
where t denotes the rate of ination. Equilibrium in the goods market requires Yt = Ct.
Furthermore, equations (8) and (9) imply the usual no-arbitrage condition:
Qt  Dt = Et

1 + t+1
Rt

EtQt+1 + t;
where, following Smets and Wouters (2003), the term t accounts for the risk implied by the
covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the nominal gross rate of return on stocks.
2.2. Supply Side. Following the literature on staggered pricing, we adopt the Calvo (1983)
specication for the price setting mechanism. The probability that a rm optimally adjusts
its price each period is 1   !. A remaining fraction ! of rms does not optimally adjust, but
simply updates the previous price according to an indexation rule. If a rm sets its price at time
t, it will do so to maximize expected prots, subject to the demand function and a constant
return to scale (CRS) production technology Yjt = ZtNjt, where Yjt denotes output and Zt is a
stochastic aggregate productivity factor. Following Ravenna and Walsh (2006), rm j borrows
an amount WtNjt from intermediaries at the gross nominal interest rate Rlt: It is assumed that
rms are completely rationed on the equity market. If internally generated funds are not enough
to nance investment, a nancial gap arises that can only be lled by resorting to the credit
market. Although rms could in principle issue new equity, this option is a priori ruled out,
due to the possibility that new equity issues would be subject to adverse selection phenomena
(see Myers and Majluf, 1984), resulting as too costly to rms. At a given share price, only
overvalued rms are willing to sell their shares. As potential shareholders anticipate this fact,
no trade occurs on the equity market. Under these conditions, the announcement of an equity
issue is generally interpreted as bad news by investors and, in extreme situations, the stock
8market becomes a typical market for lemons.4 The cost minimization problem is specied as
follows:
minRltWtNjt +t [Yjt   ZtNjt] : (10)
The real marginal cost is:
t = R
l
tSt; (11)
where St equals WtZt .
2.3. The Financial Intermediary. We assume that nancial intermediaries receive de-
positsMdt from households and a cash injection Xt (=Mt+1 Mt) from the monetary authority.
Contextually, they supply loans Lt to rms at the gross nominal interest rate Rlt. At the end of
each period, deposits Mdt together with the interest i
d
tM
d
t are repaid to households. We assume
that households are neither capable of monitoring the activity of entrepreneurs nor enforcing
nancial contracts. In this scenario, nancial intermediation is required. Intermediaries operate
costlessly in a competitive environment, so nominal prots in the intermediary industry are:
int = RltBt  RdtMdt = RltPtWtLt  RdtMdt ; (12)
where the following condition holds regarding resources available for lending:
Bt = Xt +M
d
t :
Following Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and Schabert (2006), we allow for the introduction of
varying degrees of interest rate changes to a¤ect rms lending costs. As our predecessors,
rather than introducing an explicit microfoundation, we assume for simplicity that this friction
can be measured by a function 	t, which depends on the current risk-free interest rate, 	(Rt).
Log-linearization leads to: bRlt = (1 +  ) bRt; (13)
where  (= 	RR=	) denotes the elasticity of the contractual interest rate to percentage changes
in the policy rate. A negative value for  indicates that a change in the risk-free interest rate
is not completely passed through to the lending rate, which can be rationalized by loan price
rigidities (see e.g., Hannan and Berger, 1991). Under these circumstances the cost channel is
mitigated. When  is positive, a rise in bRt is even accelerated, such that the lending rate rises by
more than one-to-one. This can be viewed as a reduced form relation based on nancial market
imperfections due to asymmetric information as accentuated in the literature on the nancial
accelerator (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999). This parameterization turns out to be
quite convenient to assess di¤erent dynamics and policy outcomes. Moreover, empirical results
support its adoption: Chowdhury, Ho¤mann, and Schabert (2006) estimate an elasticity of
0.28 for Japan and 0.32 for the United States, whereas  equals -0.45 and -0.04 in France and
4Asymmetric information is assumed to a¤ect solely the equity market. As to the credit market, it is assumed
that the banking sector has perfect information, being capable to discriminate rms on the basis of their nancial
structure.
9Germany, respectively.
2.4. Log-Linear System. The dynamic system describing the economy under scrutiny
can be linearized, so that each variable is reported in terms of log-deviation from its exible-
price equilibrium counterpart. For simplicity of exposition, in the remainder of the paper, the
following notation applies:
yt = byt   byft ; qt = bqt   bqft ;
rt = bRt   bRft ; dt = bdt   bdft :
From equations (9) and (??) we derive the following relations describing the evolution of the
output gap and the deviation of the stock price from its exible-price counterpart:
yt = Etyt+1   1

(rt   Ett+1) ; (14)
qt = (1  ) dt + Etqt+1    (rt   Ett+1) : (15)
We assume that rms fully transfer prots in the form of dividends to the stockholders. There-
fore, we impose the following aggregate resource constraint:
Dt = Yt  RltWtNt:
It is straightforward to show that the following set of variables under exible prices can be
dened in terms of percentage deviation from their steady state level:
bRft =  Etbyft+1   byft + gt ; (16)
byft = 1 +  (1 + ) zt   bRft + ht ; (17)bdft = byft ; (18)bqft = (1  ) bdft +  Etbqft+1   bRft  ; (19)
where gt =
1 h
 ht. Thus dividends can be transformed in terms of log-deviation from their
frictionless counterpart:
dt = &yt   rt; (20)
where the following notation applies:
& = 1  (   1) ( + ) ;
 = (   1) (1 +  ) :
Plugging (20) into (15) we get:
qt = yt   rt + Etqt+1 + Ett+1; (21)
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where:
 = (1  ) &;
 = (1  )+ :
Notice that an increase in the equilibrium level of the elasticity of substitution () has a
twofold detrimental e¤ect on the asset price gap: (i) via the output gap (yt) and (ii) via the
interest rate (rt). The latter is substantially amplied in the presence of strong distortions in
the credit market (  0).5
With regard to the supply-side block, optimization of the discounted ow of future prots
under Calvo pricing and log-linearization enables us to obtain the following augmented ination-
adjustment equation (see Galì and Gertler, 1999; Sbordone, 2002), which now accounts for the
cost channel e¤ect:
t = Ett+1 +  (1 +  ) rt +  ( + ) yt + "t; (22)
where "t =

1   1

(1 !)(1 !)
! ln (t=).
We also assume that the shocks have a stationary autoregressive representation:264 tht
zt
375 =  0
264 h
z
375+
264 t 1ht 1
zt 1
375+
264 %

t
%ht
%zt
375 ;
where
 0 =
264 1   0 00 1  h 0
0 0 1  z
375 ;  =
264  0 00 h 0
0 0 z
375 ; jij < 1; i = ; h; z:
and %it (i = ; h; z) are iid innovations. Steady state values of other endogenous state variables
are reported in Appendix A.
3. Transmission Mechanism in a Frictionless Economy
We turn our attention to the transmission mechanism in a frictionless economy. Under these
circumstances, the interest rate consistent with the exible-price allocation is what Woodford
(2003) refers to as the Wicksellian natural rate of interest (henceforth bRft ). Moreover, this
interest rate is compatible with full price stability (t = 0) when we rule out the short run
trade-o¤ between ination and output variability.6 To determine bRft , we consider the linear
stochastic system composed of equations (16) and (17). Therefore, we can obtain the following
5Notice that, when the cost channel e¤ect is switched o¤ ( =  1), the degree of competitiveness does not
act as an amplier of the transmission mechanism.
6 In our setting the trade-o¤ can be ruled out by assuming a constant elasticity of substitution between goods.
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solution for the natural rate of interest:
bRft =  ( +    1) (1  h) + h ht    (1 + ) (1  z) + z zt: (23)
Not surprisingly, the frictionless rate of interest increases in response to a shock to the
degree of impatience, while it decreases in response to a shock to productivity. Moreover, as
shown in (24), technological perturbations exert a positive e¤ect on the frictionless stock market
capitalization. As to the reaction to ht, the sign and the magnitude of the coe¢ cient measuring
the response appears to be steadily negative across all plausible parameterizations. By plugging
(23) into (19) we can determine the frictionless level of stock market capitalization:
bqft =  zzt   hht; (24)
where:
 z =
(1  ) (1 + )
( + ) (1  z)
+
1 +  ( +    1)
( + ) (1  z)
 (1 + ) (1  z)
( + z)
;
h =
1 +  ( +    1)
( + ) (1  h)
 ( +    1) (1  h)
( + h)
  1  
( + ) (1  h)
:
The e¤ect of the taste shock on bqft o¤ers some interesting insights. In particular, two
competing e¤ects can be identied. A positive e¤ect is channeled via the dividend process,
while a negative e¤ect comes via the no-arbitrage condition against the riskless rate of return.
It turns out that when the cost channel does not matter, the overall e¤ect is negative for  close
to 1.
It is useful to compare the e¤ect induced by the cost channel within a frictionless environment
with respect to a situation with no supply-side e¤ects. Equations (25) and (26) respectively
report the frictionless rate of interest ( bRf;NCCt ) and the level of stock market capitalization
(bqf;NCCt ) under the hypothesis that the cost channel is ruled out (see also Woodford, 1999):
bRf;NCCt = ( +    1) (1  h) +  ht    (1 + ) (1  z) +  zt: (25)
Analogously, we can determine the asset price in the absence of cost channel and cost-push
shock:
bqf;NCCt = (1 + ) (1   +  (1  z))( + ) (1  z) zt    ( +    1) (1  h)   1 + ( + ) (1  h) ht: (26)
When the cost channel is absent, the response to both sources of exogenous perturbation
is lower, in absolute value. Moreover, the di¤erence in magnitude of the reaction coe¢ cients
under the two scenarios critically depends on the degree of inertia of the shocks. The following
remark formalizes the comparison between the reaction to a technological shock for both the
stock price and the rate of interest.
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Remark 1. In a frictionless environment, the asset price response to a technological innovation
has a greater magnitude when the cost channel matters, compared to a situation in which rms
nance their production cost merely through internally generated funds. Analogous conclusions
can be advanced for the frictionless rate of interest. Therefore, the following properties hold:
bqft 
zt
> bqf;NCCt 
zt
bRft 
zt
> bRf;NCCt 
zt
:
Along the lines traced by the literature on nancial fragility (see, e.g. Kiyotaki and Moore,
1997 and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999), the existence of a cost-side e¤ect exerts a non-
negligible inuence on the amplication of exogenous shocks, also in a frictionless environment.
Moreover, as detailed by Woodford (1999), the more temporary the shock the higher the ampli-
cation in the face of an innovation to technology or to the degree of impatience. Nevertheless,
we can point out that the e¤ect brought by the degree of inertia of an exogenous perturbation
is even stronger in the presence of the cost channel. There is no clear-cut evidence about the
response of the asset price to the taste shock under the two scenarios, although for a wide range
of parameterizations a greater amplication e¤ect is detected under the cost channel.
4. Determinacy and E-stability Under Benchmark Interest Rate Rules
This section is devoted to the analysis of the dynamic properties of the system summarized
in equations (14), (15) and (22). To tackle the problem of REE uniqueness and E-stability
(see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001), we implement two instrumental Taylor-type rules that
are extensively used in the literature. As in Bullard and Mitra (2002), we rst consider a
contemporaneous data-based rule, then we turn our attention to the performance of a forecast-
based policy function.
It is well known that determinacy is attained under the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) condi-
tions. Let us assume the following state space form after implementing a specic interest rate
rule:
 xt = 
Etxt+1 +$t
where xt = [t; yt; qt]
0
and $t is a vector of shocks. In our case, in the absence of any inertial
e¤ect in the model economy and in the policy reaction functions under scrutiny, REE uniqueness
is simply achieved if the matrix   1
 has real parts of eigenvalues lying inside the unit circle. It
is important to recall that we deal with a 3 3 system. Therefore, a third degree characteristic
polynomial, denoted by z(), is retrievable from the matrix under scrutiny, where  represents
a generic eigenvalue. Under these circumstances, a necessary condition for determinacy is:
sign [z( 1)] = sign [z(1)] : (27)
For condition (27) to be also su¢ cient, we need the inection point of the curve associated with
the polynomial to lie within the interval [ 1; 1].
13
As to E-stability, the minimum state variable (MSV) solution takes the following form:
xt = $t:
Agents are assumed to form expectations by relying on the perceived law of motion (PLM),
Etxt+1 = b+ b$t. Consequently, the actual law of motion (ALM) reads as follows:
xt =  
 1
 ( +$t) +   1$t:
The T -mapping from the PLM to the ALM is:
T ( b) =   1 (
+) ;
T ( b) =   1
:
The MSV-REE is:
  1 (
+) = ;
  1
 = 0:
According to Evans and Honkapohja (2001), the MSV-REE is E-stable when the following
matrix, evaluated at the REE, has eigenvalues with real parts less than 1:
DT() = 
0 
   1
;
DT() =  
 1
:
Since 
0
has all roots with real parts less than 1, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for E-
stability of the MSV-REE is that J
 
=   1
  I  has all roots with negative real parts. From
the Routh Theorem (see Gandolfo, 1996) all roots of J have negative real parts if and only if
the following three conditions hold:
Det(J) < 0
Tr(J) < 0
S2(J)Tr(J) Det(J) < 0
where S2(J) is the sum of the 2 2 principal minors of J.
In the remainder of the paper, we study determinacy and E-stability conditions under two
benchmark policy reaction functions. Given the dimension of our system, the analysis is partly
based on the evidence retrievable from simulation exercises. The calibrated values for  and 
turn out to be crucial for pursuing a numerical exploration. In the remainder of the paper we
alternatively consider the parameterizations suggested by Woodford (1999) (W), Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (1999) (CGG), and McCallum and Nelson (1999) (MN), summarized in Table 1.
Moreover we assume that  = 0:99,  = 2 and  = 3, if not stated otherwise.
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W CGG MN
 0:157 1 10:164
 0:0235+
0:3
+
0:3
+
Table 1: Calibrations
4.1. Contemporaneous Data Rule. We rst consider a Taylor rule that reacts to con-
temporaneous ination, output gap and asset prices misalignments:
rt = t + yyt + qqt: (28)
To analyze determinacy and stability under learning, we write the system in state space form:
 cxt = 
cEtxt+1 +cut;
ut = ut 1 + et; et
iid N(0; 2e);
where xt = [t; yt; qt] and:
 c =
2664
1   (1 +  )  
 
 +  + (1 +  )y
   (1 +  )q



1 +
y


q

 y   
 
1 + q

3775 ;

c =
264  0 01 1 0
 0 
375 ; c = I33;  = I33:
To ensure equilibrium uniqueness and stability under adaptive learning, we need to verify
that the conditions reported are fullled. Retrieving analytical conditions for a 3  3 system
loses much of the usual appeal in terms of the power to draw clear conclusions. We nd more
intuitive to plot the regions of determinacy and E-stability through a numerical simulation of
the model over a wide parameter sub-space for the policy rules coe¢ cients.
Nonetheless, we nd that some appealing analytical results can be provided by considering
a rule responding only to the rate of ination. The resulting conditions retain considerable
importance for those monetary authorities exclusively or primarily concerned with ination
stabilization. Brückner and Schabert (2003) and Llosa and Tuesta (2007) show that the cost
channel modies the standard conditions for determinacy and learnability when the central
bank operates with either instrument or target rules. Their analysis is based on a NK model
featuring a cost channel à la Ravenna and Walsh (2006). This is to say that the degree of pass-
through  from policy to bank lending rates can either take value  1 (no cost channel) or 0 (cost
channel with perfect pass-through). The following proposition shows that traditional conditions
for determinacy and E-stability are further a¤ected when the whole spectrum of values for
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the pass-through parameter is considered. It turns out that, when the central bank sets the
policy instrument in response to the rate of ination, the width of the region of determinacy
dramatically depends on the level of pass-through. Under these circumstances, it is extremely
important to assess the magnitude of the cost channel e¤ect.
Proposition 2. Under a contemporaneous data interest rate rule responding to the rate of
ination, the following conditions ensuring equilibrium uniqueness can be identied:
 I¤  >  :
 < b =  (   1) (    ) : (29)
 I¤  >  2 :
 < e = 2 (1 + ) +  ( + ) ( (1 + 2 )  ) : (30)
 I¤  <  2 :
 >  = 1: (31)
Proof. See Appendix A.
To attain stability under adaptive learning, we need to check that the eigenvalues of Jc33 I
are negative. It can be easily shown that the su¢ cient and necessary conditions require both
Cc > 0 and Dc > 0 in the characteristic polynomial retrievable from Jc33   I:
2 + Cc+Dc = 0;
where
Cc =
 (1  ) +  (    ) +  ( + ) (   1)
 +  (    )
;
Dc =
 ( + ) (   1)
 +  (    )
:
Conditions for E-stability are fully nested in those for determinacy. In Appendix A we report
a proposition and a corollary regarding the E-stability conditions under a contemporaneous
interest rate rule. Moreover, the following corollary provides a series of response intervals to
contemporaneous ination that ensure equilibrium uniqueness, by taking into consideration the
degree of pass-through from the o¢ cial rate to the credit market interest rate.
Corollary 3. The set of conditions stated in the proposition above allows us to determine an
interval for critical values of the pass-through:
1. I¤  <  2 the system will always be determinate if  > 1.
2. I¤  2   <
(1 )+( 1++3+1)
+4+ the response coe¢ cient to ination has to lie within
the area between the locus e and the bottom limit represented by  = 1;
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3. I¤
(1 )+( 1++3+1)
+4+   <  + (1 ) the response coe¢ cient to ination has to lie
within the area between the locus b and the bottom limit represented by  = 1;
4. I¤    + (1 ) determinacy is never attained.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Conditions reported in Corollary 3 underline the importance of assessing the degree of pass-
through when setting up the response coe¢ cient to contemporaneous ination. We perform a
series of numerical exercises to explore the conditions for determinacy and E-stability under
the Taylor rule expressed in (28). Therefore, we consider a monetary authority that not only
responds to the rate of ination, but also to output gap and asset prices misalignments. We rely
on the set of calibrated parameters proposed by McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Woodford
(1999). Results from the MN parameterization are reported in the main text.7 We perform each
numerical exercise under three di¤erent values of the pass-through parameter ( = f 1; 0; 0:5g).
Thus, we can readily observe the e¤ect induced by an increasing importance of the cost channel
e¤ect. In line with Bullard and Mitra (2002), the autoregressive coe¢ cients of the structural
shocks are set to produce log-stationary perturbations.
Moreover, the red-pink (darker) area denotes the space of indeterminacy and E-instability,
whereas the turquoise area (lighter) is associated with the space of indeterminacy and E-stability
under learning. The white area denotes combinations of responses that ensure both determinacy
and E-stability. The gures in each panel will be referred to as (a), (b) and (c) from left to
right.
Determinacy and E-Stability Region (a)
y
c p
-0.5 0 0.5 1
1
2
3
4
Determinacy and E-Stability Region (b)
y
c p
-0.5 0 0.5 1
1
2
3
4
Figure 1: Regions of determinacy and E-stability [MN (a) and W (b) calibrations]
Figure 1 plots E-stability and determinacy regions for di¤erent values of the pass-through
when the central bank responds only to the ination rate. On the one hand, determinacy
cannot be achieved when  >  +
(1 )
 (about 0:60 under MN calibration). On the other hand,
determinacy will always be achieved if  <  2 (about  0:34 under MN calibration). Between
these two thresholds there are two conditions that prevent the central bank from responding too
strongly to ination. As the value of the pass-through is always smaller than  under Woodford
7The calibration proposed in McCallum and Nelson (1999) is often implemented in adaptive learning stud-
ies, especially when focusing on the e¢ ciency of di¤erent Taylor-type rules in ensuring REE uniqueness and
learnability. Numerical simulations for Woodford (1999) calibration are available from authors upon request.
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(1999) calibration, the standard condition for determinacy, formalized in the Taylor principle,
is never altered when the central bank responds only to ination. To ensure determinacy, when
the value of pass-through is greater than  +
(1 )
 , the central bank has to respond to either
the output gap or asset prices, along with responding to the rate of ination.
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Figure 2: Regions of determinacy and E-stability with q = 0
In the second round of simulations we determine conditions for determinacy and E-stability
in the f; yg space. In the rst exercise (Figure 2) we set q = 0, whereas in the second
exercise (Figure 3) we impose q = 0:5. Figure 2(a) plots the combinations of f; yg ensuring
determinacy and E-stability when the cost channel is ruled out ( =  1). The resulting
conditions can be summarized in the well known Taylor principle. Figures 2a and 2b show that,
as the degree of pass-through increases, the Taylor principle is no longer su¢ cient to guarantee
determinacy. Turning the attention to the combinations ensuring equilibrium uniqueness in
the presence of a cost channel e¤ect with perfect pass-through, it is evident how the area of
indeterminacy enlarges, as it shifts up on the  axis and decreases in y. Given that the
nominal rate of interest has a direct e¤ect on the rate of ination via bank lending, a higher
degree of reactiveness is required to avoid non-fundamental uctuations in output and ination.
For a higher degree of pass-through ( = 0:5), which reects strong credit market distortions,
we can better appreciate the intuition behind Corollary 3. In this case, responding only to
ination might not ensure equilibrium uniqueness. In fact, Figure 2(c) shows that a region
of indeterminacy arises along the  axis, whenever the central bank does not react to the
output gap or when it reacts too weakly
 
y u 0

. A monetary contraction designed to ght
inationary pressures results in even higher ination due to the fact that interest rate has a
direct e¤ect on ination in the NKPC. When there is a strong pass-through, the price puzzle
e¤ect is even more accentuated. Reacting to the contemporaneous rate of ination will lead to
higher ination in the next period, eventually driving the system in the area of indeterminacy.
We can observe that in most of the cases the area of E-stability is matches the one of
indeterminacy. The possibility of learnable sunspot equlibria can occur only when the degree
of pass-through is very high [as in Figure 2(c)]. The spike of indeterminacy occurring for a low
response to asset prices misalignments and output gap is E-stable.8
8 If we would assume the PLM of the MSV-REE form (no constant in the PLM) then results for E-stability
would change. For  < 0:98 the area denoting E-unstable equilibria would shrink when q and y increase.
However, it would enlarge as the degree of distortion  increases. This result is robust across di¤erent calibrations.
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Figure 3: Regions of determinacy and E-stability with q = 0:5
In Figure 3, we assume that the monetary authority implements a rule featuring a positive
response to asset prices misalignments (q = 0:5). Overall, responding to asset prices enlarges
the area of indeterminacy. In particular, this shifts up and its slope increases in  . Neverthe-
less, with a positive q the central bank excludes the likelihood of equilibrium multiplicity in
correspondence with a small response to the output gap, along the  axis. This is particularly
evident from the comparison of Figures 2(c) and 3(c).
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Figure 4: Regions of determinacy and E-stability with y = 0
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Figure 5: Regions of Determinacy and E-Stability with  = 2
Figure 5 suggests that the central bank should never react too strongly to asset prices
misalignments. The maximum threshold ensuring both determinacy and E-stability is always
higher for y rather than q. Nevertheless, if we repeat the same exercise under a higher 
[e.g.  = 3 in Figure 5(c)] an area of indeterminacy will be detectable in correspondence of
low values of both coe¢ cients. In this case, we would observe that an approximately four times
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lower q is required to drive the system into the area of determinacy, compared to the necessary
y. This is even more evident under a forward looking rule.
4.2. Forward Looking Expectational Rule. Next, we consider a forward looking rule
where the monetary authority reacts to future expected ination, output gap and asset prices
misalignments:
rt = Ett+1 + yEtyt+1 + qEtqt+1: (32)
The model in state space form can be written as:
 fxt = 
fEtxt+1 +fut;
ut = ut 1 + et; et
iid N(0; 2e);
where xt = [t; yt; qt] and

f =
264  +  (1 +  )  (1 +  )y  (1 +  )q1 (1  ) 1  y  q
     y    q
375 ;
 f =
264 1   ( + ) 00 1 0
0   1
375 ; f = I33;  = I33:
Again, to assess the e¤ects brought by the cost channel in terms of REE uniqueness and
learnability, we nd intuitive to study the system under a rule responding only to expected
ination. The following proposition shows that traditional conditions for determinacy and E-
stability are further altered when di¤erent degrees of distortion a¤ect the credit market.
Proposition 4. Under an interest rate rule responding only to expected ination in the pres-
ence of a cost channel, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing determinacy can be
stated as follows:
 I¤  >  1:
 =  > 1 (33)
 < b = 1   ( + 1) (34)
 I¤  <  2 :
 < e = 2 (1 + ) +  ( + ) ( + )  2 (1 +  ) (35)
Proof. See Appendix A.
It can be shown that the conditions ensuring E-stability are fully encompassed by those
guaranteeing equilibrium uniqueness. In Appendix A we report a proposition and a corollary
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regarding the E-stability conditions under a forward looking interest rate rule. Moreover, the
following corollary identies the range of responses to expected ination ensuring equilibrium
uniqueness and E-stability, depending on the degree of pass-through from the o¢ cial rate to
the credit market interest rate.
Corollary 5. The set of conditions stated in the proposition above allows us to determine an
interval for critical values of the pass-through:
1. I¤  1 <   (1 )(+)4+(+)   1 the response coe¢ cient to ination has to lie within the area
between the locus e and the bottom limit represented by  = 1.
2. I¤ (1 )(+)4+(+)   1 <  < 1   the response coe¢ cient has to be lie within the area
between the locus b and the bottom limit represented by  = 1.
3. I¤   1   determinacy is never attained.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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Figure 6: Regions of determinacy and E-stability [MN (a) and W (b) Calibrations]
Conditions reported in Corollary 5 point out the importance of considering the degree of
pass-through when setting up the response coe¢ cient to the expected future ination. Figure 6
shows the dynamic properties of the system in the f ; g space. If the central bank reacts only
to the rate of ination, a unique REE can be obtained only for low values of the pass-through.
As detailed in Corollary 5, the monetary authority has to avoid a strong reaction to ination
as this might shift the system into the area of indeterminacy.9
Figures 7(b) and 7(c) show that the system delivers an indeterminate outcome in the presence
of the cost channel, over the whole spectrum of , when the central bank does not respond either
to expected assets prices misalignments or to output gap. Again, following a rule that responds
only to expected ination the central bank will trigger inationary pressures via the banking
system. This is especially evident when pricing behavior in this sector amplies movements in
the policy rate. In addition, the spike of indeterminacy rising along the -axis is greater than
the one obtained under a contemporaneous rule. It is also important to stress that to rule out
indeterminacy the response coe¢ cient to the expected output gap has to increase in the degree
of pass-through.
9 It is also worth pointing out that the determinacy area is wider under the set of calibrated parameters
suggested by Woodford (1999).
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Figure 7: Regions of determinacy and E-stability with q = 0
Simulations reported in Figure 7 also conrm the basic results observed in Figure 6. Under
large distortions ( > 0), as those reected in Figure 7(c), the central bank has to respond quite
strongly to the output gap and to make sure that its reaction to ination is not too strong, as
this would lead to an indeterminate outcome. It is interesting to notice that signicant part of
the spike of indeterminacy for low responses to asset prices misalignments and output gap is
E-stable.
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Figure 8: Regions of determinacy and E-stability with q = 0:1
If we replicate the last exercise by setting q = 0:1 (Figure 8), the indeterminacy area
previously detectable for low values of y is now signicantly smaller. Relatively low values
of the reaction coe¢ cient attached to expected asset prices misalignments allow the central
bank not to respond to the output gap. At the same time, the response to ination should be
constrained within a certain range. In this case, there is a higher probability to attain a unique
REE if the central bank responds to asset prices misalignments. Moreover, by responding
to asset prices the E-instability area previously detectable for low values of y signicantly
decreases or is compleately removed (see also Figure 10).
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Figure 9: Regions of determinacy and E-stability with q = 0:5
As shown in Figure 9, a greater response to asset price misalignments
 
q = 0:5

would
almost completely remove the area of instability arising at low values of y. Nonetheless, the
minimum response to ination has to be stronger, compared to the previous exercise.
To conrm the results from previous simulations, we also report determinacy conditions in
the

q; 
	
space for y = 0 (Figure 10), while Figure 11 reports the area of determinacy in
the

q; y
	
space for  = 2. Figure 10 shows that a higher response to asset prices has to
be accompanied by a higher response to ination to ensure equilibrium uniqueness. Moreover,
Figure 11 shows that the area of determinacy signicantly narrows down as the degree of pass-
through increases and reects a highly distortive allocation mechanism in the credit market.
Ceteris paribus ( = 2 and  = 0:5), the value of q required to shift the system into the area
of determinacy is twice as small as the necessary y, although the range of responses ensuring
determinacy is higher in the second case.
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Figure 10: Regions of determinacy and E-stability with y = 0
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Figure 11: Regions of determinacy and E-stability with  = 2
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The analysis of the conditions for equilibrium uniqueness o¤ers an interesting picture. It
turns out that even a low response to asset prices misalignments helps at ruling out the area of
indeterminacy that arises if the monetary authority reacts only to the rate of ination. Overall,
a joint response to both Etqt+1 and Etyt+1 generally leads to a wider area of determinacy. The
central bank achieves greater benets from the implementation of a rule featuring a relatively
lower response to the expected output gap. Otherwise, if the monetary authority does not
respond to asset prices misalignments, then it should attach a signicantly stronger response to
Etyt+1. It is interesting to point out that, under the Woodford (1999) calibration (Appendix
B), the area of determinacy is much wider when the central bank responds to asset prices rather
than to the output gap. Simulations under this set of parameters conrm the importance of
reacting to either asset prices or output gap in the presence of strong credit market distortions.
4.3. Discussion. As our analytical and numerical results show, standard conditions for de-
terminacy and E-stability are modied when the cost channel matters. We show that responding
to asset prices misalignments in the presence of strong distortions a¤ecting the credit market
allows the central bank to restore REE uniqueness and E-stability. This is particularly evident
when the monetary authority implements a forward looking rule (32), as the system is more
sensitive to changes in the degree of pass-through. In this case, even a weak cost channel e¤ect
introduces signicant changes in the conditions for determinacy and E-stability. In fact, under
a contemporaneous data rule, a higher  is necessary to observe a spike of indeterminacy for
low values of the response coe¢ cient attached to the output gap. This is to say that, especially
under uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the cost channel e¤ect, a monetary authority is
better o¤ by responding to current rather than to forecast data. This strategy generally allows
the central bank to face a wider area of determinacy.
In standard NK frameworks with no capital market imperfections, dividends are negatively
related to the output gap. As marginal costs are proportional to the output gap, an interest
rate rule that responds positively to (expected or current) stock price deviations from their
frictionless level is a rule that responds positively to rmsprotability. This amounts to say
that the central bank responds negatively to the underlying distortionthe marginal cost. This
is exactly the opposite of what should be done to achieve stabilization. When a cost channel
e¤ect is at work, this mechanism no longer holds. This is especially evident for high values of the
pass-through, which reect a distortive allocation mechanism in the credit market. In this case,
the monetary instrument a¤ects positively marginal costs, hence a monetary innovation exerts
a direct inuence on ination dynamics in the same direction. At the same time, inationary
pressures are scaled down if the central bank responds positively to asset prices, as this reects
a negative response to the output gap that balances the cost channel e¤ect in the NK curve.
In presence of cost-side e¤ects, reacting to either contemporaneous or expected asset prices
misalignments shifts upwards the set of conditions that bind the response to the rate of ination
from above. This mechanism is at the root of the gain in determinacy when we consider a positive
response to current or expected asset prices misalignments. Therefore, if the cost channel
matters, we draw opposite policy prescriptions with respect to those advanced by Carlstrom
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and Fuerst (2007) in their baseline framework. As a matter of fact, they assert that one
shortcoming of the benchmark model is that in response to a monetary contraction, marginal
cost falls so sharply that prots actually rise.10 Our model abstracts from this criticism, as
protability is directly a¤ected by the nominal interest rate via a cost channel e¤ect.
5. Welfare Analysis
We shift our focus on the welfare implications of the two benchmark rules under scrutiny. In line
with Orphanides and Williams (2007), we analyze the loss incurred by the monetary authority
under di¤erent stabilization objectives. The following loss specications are considered:
L1 = 
2
t + '
yy2t ; (36)
L2 = 
2
t + '
yy2t + '
r (rt)
2 ; (37)
L3 = 
2
t + '
yy2t + '
qq2t + '
r (rt)
2 ; (38)
L4 = 
2
t + '
yy2t + '
qq2t : (39)
Calibration of the coe¢ cients in the loss function is still an open issue in the literature. Notice
that usually the coe¢ cient attached to ination is normalized to 1. According to Orphanides
and Williams (2006), the coe¢ cient attached to the output gap is set to 4, in line with Okuns
law. This implies equal weights to the rate of ination and the output gap in the loss function.
Orphanides and Williams (2006) also consider a benchmark calibration 'r = 1. In the remainder
of the paper, we will set 'q = 4. However, our qualitative results are not a¤ected if we consider
smaller values for the relative weight attached to the interest rate smoothing term. Overall, our
results are quite robust across di¤erent calibrations of the coe¢ cients characterizing the relative
importance of competing welfare objectives.
A word of caution is in order at this stage. In a standard NK setting it is possible to provide
microfoundations for a loss function that balances ination and output gap variability through
a second order approximation (see Woodford, 2003). Conversely, in the present framework there
is no direct analytical rationale for the introduction of a term penalizing stock price uctuations
[as in (38) and (39)]. The purpose of this exercise is to assess the desirability to react to asset
price uctuations in the presence of a cost channel e¤ect.
In the remainder of this section numerical results are presented just under loss specications
(36) and (39). Moreover, a perfect pass-through from policy to bank lending rates ( = 0) is
assumed in the graphical analysis.11 Figures 12 and 13 report the loss under di¤erent combina-
tions of y and  under the contemporaneous data rule, while Figures 14 and 15 refer to the
forward looking rule. In addition, Tables 1 and 2 report the minimum loss and the correspond-
ing response parameters to ination and output gap, both under the contemporaneous (28) and
the forward looking rule (32).12 Moreover, we report the loss corresponding to a benchmark
10To counter this criticism, they incorporate sticky wages in the basic model and show that indeterminacy may
still arise even if prots are now a¤ected by both sources of nominal rigidity.
11Notice that the contour maps are plotted only in correspondence with the space of determinacy.
12Notice that, as in the graphical inspection, we consider a maximum response of 4 in the

; y
	
space.
Therefore, the concept of minimum loss has to be regarded with respect to the space considered.
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parameterization often implemented in numerical studies, namely  = 1:5 and y = 0:5. The
results are conditioned to the degree of pass-through ( = f 1; 0; 0:5g) and to the response to
asset prices, which is either set to 0 or to 0:1.
Value of Loss Function (a)
cy
c p
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Value of Loss Function (b)
cy
c p
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Figure 12: Loss for contemporaneous data rule in the region of determinacy under (36):
(a) q = 0 and (b) q = 0:1
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Figure 13: Loss for contemporaneous data rule in the region of determinacy under (39):
(a) q = 0 and (b) q = 0:1
Figure 12 shows that, under (36), welfare losses are generally smaller if the central bank
is strenuously involved in keeping ination under control. At the same time, reacting to asset
price misalignments exerts a negative impact. In Figure 13, we report the results under the
loss function (39). Previous evidence is reversed when the central bank cares about asset prices
variability. In this case the loss is on average smaller if the monetary authority attaches a low
reaction coe¢ cient to the rate of ination.
Figures 14 and 15 plot the contour map for the loss functions (36) and (39) under a forward
looking interest rate rule. The graphical inspection suggests that the results under a forward
looking rule are qualitatively assimilable to those detailed for a contemporaneous data rule.
Moreover, numerical analysis suggests that, in the presence of any institutional or operational
reason to be concerned with asset prices variability, then the central bank is better o¤ by
responding to asset prices misalignments.
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Loss under (36)
Min Loss Min at

; y
	
Loss at  = 1:5 and y = 0:5
 =  1;q = 0 52.2 f4; 2:42g 120.1
 =  1;q = 0:1 61.9 f4; 3:37g 223.5
 = 0;q = 0 64.1 f4; 0:95g 149.1
 = 0;q = 0:1 74.9 f4; 0:75g 288.6
 = 0:5;q = 0 73.6 f4; 0:37g 177.5
 = 0:5;q = 0:1 83.9 f4; 0g 352.1
Loss under (39)
 =  1;q = 0 3361 f1; 0:01g 8276
 =  1;q = 0:1 2809 f1:05; 0:02g 6400
 = 0;q = 0 5819 f1; 0g 10718
 = 0;q = 0:1 5416 f1:11; 0g 8871
 = 0:5;q = 0 8042 f1; 0g 12574
 = 0:5;q = 0:1 8090 f1:15; 0g 10914
Table 2: Loss under contemporaneous data rule
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Figure 14: Loss for forward looking rule in the region of determinacy under (36):
(a) q = 0 and (b) q = 0:1
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Figure 15: Loss for forward looking rule in the region of determinacy under (39):
(a) q = 0 and (b) q = 0:1
We can observe that loss under both specications (36) and (39) increases in the degree
of pass-through. Reacting to asset prices misalignments determines an increase in the overall
volatility, at every value of the pass-through. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of the asset price
volatility term into the loss function determines a marked increase in the overall welfare loss.
This can be ascribed to the presence of excess volatility in asset prices misalignments, compared
to ination and output gap. Excess volatility is an inherent feature of asset prices and it is often
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Loss under (36)
Min Loss Min at

; y
	
Loss at  = 1:5 and y = 0:5
 =  1;q = 0 47.3 f4; 4g 124.1
 =  1;q = 0:1 53.6 f4; 4g 238.0
 = 0;q = 0 63.3 f4; 2:81g 157.4
 = 0;q = 0:1 70.9 f4; 3:1g 319.3
 = 0:5;q = 0 73.5 f4; 1:94g 190.3
 = 0:5;q = 0:1 83.9 f4; 1:84g 398.5
Loss under (39)
 =  1;q = 0 2377 f1; 0:01g 8131
 =  1;q = 0:1 2131 f1:05; 0:02g 6165
 = 0;q = 0 5113 f1:02; 0:17g 10505
 = 0;q = 0:1 4465 f1:12; 0g 8545
 = 0:5;q = 0 8073 f1:05; 0:29g 12344
 = 0:5;q = 0:1 7212 f1:17; 0g 10570
Table 3: Loss under forward looking rule
advanced as a rationale for avoiding an explicit response to them (see, e.g., Bullard and Schaling,
2002). In addition, our numerical exercises conrm that it is benecial to react to asset prices
misalignments when the loss function incorporates a term reecting their volatility, for both
Taylor-type rules and for both criteria of welfare loss evaluation.
The minimum possible loss is generally lower under a forward looking rule than under a
contemporaneous data reaction function. However, the minimum loss with a forward looking
rule under (36) is often achieved at "implausibly" high responses to output gap. The advantage
of the forward looking rule over the contemporaneous rule in terms of minimum loss tends to
vanish as the degree of pass-through increases. Therefore, we nd quite informative to assess
the loss under a more plausible parameterization, such as

 = 1:5; y = 0:5
	
. In this case, we
can notice that a contemporaneous data rule produces a lower loss, both under (36) and (39).
Moreover, as to the combination of

; y
	
ensuring the minimum loss, a strong reaction to
ination is generally required under (36), while y is lower and decreases in the degree of pass-
through. Intuitively, as the pass-through parameter increases, reecting a nancial accelerator
e¤ect via the banking sector, the volatilities of ination, asset prices and output gap rise. We
nd that output gap variability has a relatively small response to changes in  , compared to
that of ination and asset prices.13 This e¤ect is even more evident under (39). When the loss
function incorporates a term reecting asset prices volatility, the monetary authority needs a
relatively higher q. In this case, also the response to ination must be minimal, as asset prices
volatility accounts for the majority of the welfare loss. In addition, further numerical analysis
shows that asset prices volatility increases in  and y.
13Notice that the degree of pass-through does not enter the IS specication.
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Concluding Remarks
We develop a New Keynesian macroeconomic model to study the interplay between capital
market imperfections, rm protability and ination dynamics. We rely on a sticky price
framework featuring a cost-side e¤ect along the lines traced by Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
We extend the baseline model in two main directions: rst, following Chowdhury, Ho¤mann,
and Schabert (2006), we allow for the introduction of varying degrees of interest rate changes to
a¤ect rmscosts of lending; second, we consider the direct inuence of credit market distortions
on rm protability and, in turn, stock price dynamics. We provide an analytical treatment of
the conditions ensuring REE uniqueness and E-stability when the monetary authority reacts
only to ination. Standard conditions turn out to be signicantly di¤erent in the presence of
strong credit market distortions.
Numerical simulations allow us to study the performance of interest rate rules reacting to the
current (or expected) output gap, ination and asset prices misalignments. Moreover, we assess
the loss of welfare incurred by the monetary authority in the presence of di¤erent degrees of
the pass-through between the policy instrument and bank lending rates under di¤erent Taylor-
type rules. Our analysis shows that considering a one-to-one relationship between policy rates
and bank lending rates, as assumed in Ravenna and Walsh (2006), can be quite misleading
for the sake of designing a rule that ensures REE determinacy and stability under adaptive
learning when the cost channel matters. We show that in conditions of uncertainty regarding
the degree of pass-through between policy and bank lending rates, the central bank is generally
better o¤ following a rule in which the policy instrument is set according to misalignments in
contemporaneous data rather than adopting an expectational interest rate rule. Moreover, in
the former case, a considerably wider area of determinacy can be achieved. In addition, for
a plausible range of responses to ination and output gap the adoption of a contemporaneous
data rule ensures, on average, a lower welfare loss.
When the cost channel matters, the risk of indeterminacy and instability under adaptive
learning can be reduced if the central bank reacts positively to actual (or expected) asset prices
misalignments from their frictionless values or to current (or expected) output gap. It can often
be argued that a response to asset prices might be even more desirable than a response to
the output gap to ensure determinacy. This is the case when monetary policy is conducted in
environments characterized by strong credit market distortions. In principle, this strategy has
a negative e¤ect on rmsprotability and raises the risk of inationary pressures. Neverthe-
less, as in a sticky price framework rmsprotability is negatively related to the output gap,
inationary pressures brought by the cost channel e¤ect can be smoothed down if the central
bank responds positively to asset prices misalignments. Therefore, a positive response to out-of-
equilibrium dynamics in asset prices balances the negative impact brought by the cost channel
on ination dynamics, especially in the presence of a strong pass-through from policy to bank
lending rates. These results contradict the policy prescriptions achieved by previous studies
exploring the role of monetary policy as a potential nancial stabilizer. Most importantly, our
ndings highlight the need to carefully assess the degree of credit market distortions to draw
29
sound prescriptions for monetary policy design.
Future work appears desirable in several areas. In a companion paper, we explore the
implications of the cost channel for the design of optimal monetary policy, assuming that the
central bank is faced with a loss function that balances asset price variability along with output
and ination. We also aim at exploring further the nature of the E-stable equilibria in the area
of indeterminacy, in order to assess the conditions for sunspots learnability and their policy
implications. More generally, we argue that it is important to further explore the informational
content of asset prices for the conduct of monetary policy.
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6. Appendix A
Steady State Values
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 :
6.1. E-stability: Contemporaneous rule.
Proposition 6. Under a contemporaneous data interest rate rule responding to the rate of
ination, the following conditions ensuring E-stability can be identied:
 I¤  >  1
 >  = 1: (40)
 I¤  < 1 + 2 :
 > b = (1  )      ( (   1)  2) (41)
 I¤  > 1 + 2 :
 < e = (1  )      ( (   1)  2) (42)
Proof. If we set q = 0 in (28), the discount factor  turns out to be one of the three
eigenvalues of the matrix   1c 
c. Under these settings, the NK Phillips curve and the IS curve
constitute an autonomous system. Moreover, when y = 0 the matrix of structural parameters
associated to the forward looking vector is the following cofactor:
Jc33 =
"
++
+     1
2+
+  
 ++  1+    
 + 
+     1
#
:
This setup implies that the necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing E-stability can be
stated as follows:
Bc > 0 (43)
Ac > 0; (44)
where Ac and Bc are the coe¢ cients of the characteristic polynomial retrievable from Jc33   I:
2 +Ac+Bc = 0:
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Thus:
Ac =
    +      +  + 
 +     
+ 2
Bc =
 
2 + 

( +  +     1)
( +     )2
 

    +  
 +     
+ 1

 +  + 
 +     
  1

Let us focus on condition (43):
Ac =
    +      +  + 
 +  (    )
+ 2 > 0
We have to multiply both sides by the term  +  (    ). On the one hand, this factor is
always positive for  <  (su¢ cient condition). On the other hand, when  >

 , we need to
introduce a restriction on  in order to ensure its positiveness.
Condition 1: In order to rule out the possibility that the term + (    ) is negative,
we have to assume that i¤  >  the following restriction applies:
0 <  <

 (   )
:
Notice that this condition holds across di¤erent plausible parameterizations and is always sat-
ised by the three sets of calibrated parameters taken into consideration in the paper. Thus,
we can rearrange (43) as:
(  1) +  +  + ( (   1)  2) > 0
At this stage there are two relevant cases to consider, namely 1 + 2 <  and 1 +
2
 >  . In
the rst case, the response to ination must satisfy the following condition:
 >
(1  )      
( (   1)  2)
Otherwise, the maximum response to ination is constrained from the following condition:
 <
(1  )      
( (   1)  2)
Let us focus now on (44):
 (   1) ( + )
 +  (    )
> 0 (45)
as we assume that denominator is always positive, (45) always holds for  > 1.
Corollary 7. The set of conditions stated in the proposition above allows us to determine an
interval for critical values of the pass-through:
1. I¤  <  +
(1 )
 the system will always be E-stable if  > 1.
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2. I¤  +
(1 )
   < 1 + 2 the response coe¢ cient to ination has to be set according to
 > b;
3. I¤   1 + 2 E-stability is never attained.
Proof. Notice that conditions (40) and (41) represent a minimum response threshold. The
conditions reported in Proposition 6 are considered in the f;  g space.
By equating (40) and (41) we nd the value of  from which the condition (41) is binding.
From the point where conditions (41) and (42) equal

 = 1 + 2

E-stability can never be
attained.
6.2. E-stability: forward looking rule.
Proposition 8. Under an interest rate rule responding only to expected ination in the pres-
ence of a cost channel, the necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing E-stability can be
stated as follows:
 I¤  >  1:
 >  = 1: (46)
 I¤  <  :
 > b =  ( + )   (1  ) (    ) (47)
 I¤  >  :
 < e =  (1  )   ( + ) (   ) (48)
Proof. For q = y = 0 the matrix of structural parameters associated to the forward
looking vector is represented by the following cofactor:
Jf33 =
"
 +  ( + 1)   (   1) ( + )  ( + )
  1 (   1) 1
#
:
The necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing E-stability are:
Bf > 0 (49)
Af > 0 (50)
where are the parameters of the characteristic polynomial associated to Jf33 I. Thus (49) and
(50) read as: 

(   1) ( + )   ( + 1)   + 1

> 0 (51)


(   1) ( + ) > 0 (52)
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It is immediate to verify that Af is always greater than zero i¤  > 1. As to condition (??),
this can be rearranged as:
(    ) >  ( + )   (1  )
Now, i¤  <  , the relevant condition reads as:
 >
 ( + )   (1  )
 (    )
otherwise, for  >  :
 <
 (1  )   ( + )
 (   )
Corollary 9. The set of conditions stated in the proposition above allows us to determine an
interval for critical values of the pass-through:
1. I¤  < 1   the system will always be E-stable if  > 1.
2. I¤ 1     <  the response coe¢ cient to ination has to be set according to  > b;
3. I¤    E-stability is never attained.
Proof. Notice that conditions (46) and (47) represent a minimum response threshold. The
conditions reported in Proposition 8 are considered in the f;  g space.
By equating (46) and (47) we nd the value of  from which the condition (47) is binding.
From the point where conditions (47) and (48) equal
 
 = 

E-stability can never be attained.
6.3. Proof Proposition 2. Proof. If we set q = 0 in (28), the discount factor 
turns out to be one of the three eigenvalues of the matrix   1c 
c. Under these settings, the NK
Phillips curve and the IS curve constitute an autonomous system, where the matrix of structural
parameters associated to the forward looking vector is the following cofactor:
Jc33 =
"
++
+  
2+
+  
  1+ ++    
 + 
+  
#
:
This setup implies that the necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing determinacy can
be stated as follows:
jBcj < 1; (53)
jAcj < 1 +Bc; (54)
where Ac and Bc are the coe¢ cients of the characteristic polynomial retrievable from Jc33:
2 +Ac+Bc = 0:
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Assuming that y = 0 we obtain:
Ac =
 (1 +  )   (1 + )   ( + )
 +  (    )
;
Bc =

 +  +  (    )
:
Let us focus rst on condition (53):  +  (    )
 < 1;
which translates into:

 +  (    )
< 1; (55)

 +  (    )
>  1: (56)
We take into consideration the rst inequality (55). We have to multiply both sides by its
denominator. On the one hand, this factor is always be positive for  <  (su¢ cient condition).
On the other hand, when  >  , we need to introduce a restriction on  in order to ensure its
positiveness. Under Condition 1, we can rearrange (55) as:
 (   1) <  (    ) :
In order to derive a condition for the response coe¢ cient  we have to divide the inequality
by  (    ) on both sides. This term is negative when  > . In this case we end up with
the following condition:
 (   1)
 (    ) > : (57)
In the opposite case, when  <  , we get:
 (   1)
 (    ) < : (58)
Note that the term on the LHS of (58) is always negative. Let us consider condition (56):
  ( + 1) <  (    ) :
Again, in order to isolate  on the RHS we have to divide both sides of the inequality by
 (    ). Thus, i¤  >  , we get:
 ( + 1)
 (   ) > : (59)
When  >  the term
(+1)
(  ) is always positive under the restriction characterizing the baseline
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parameterization. In the opposite case when  <  we get:
 ( + 1)
 (   ) < : (60)
As this threshold is always be negative, condition (60) is fully nested in  > 1. Thus we do
not have to consider it.
Let us turn the attention to the second condition for determinacy, namely (54). This leads
to the following inequalities:
 (1 +  )   (1 + )   ( + )
 +  (    )
< 1 +

 +  (    )
; (61)
 (1 +  )   (1 + )   ( + )
 +  (    )
>  1  
 +  (    )
: (62)
We rst focus on the former. Again, by assuming that Condition 1 holds true we get:
 ( (1 + 2 )  ) < 2 (1 + ) +  ( + ) :
Thus we have to consider the sign of the term  ( (1 + 2 )  ). This turns out to be always
positive i¤  <  (su¢ cient condition). Nevertheless, we the following condition has also to be
considered:
 >

2
  1
2
=
   
2
:
As  2 <

 the following condition is only valid for,  >
 
2 , i¤ 0 <  <

(  ) :
 <
2 (1 + ) +  ( + )
 ( (1 + 2 )  ) : (63)
Otherwise, when  <  2 , we end up with:
 >
2 (1 + ) +  ( + )
 ( (1 + 2 )  ) : (64)
But then this expression is always negative and thus it is nested in the Taylor principle,  > 1.
Let us consider now (62). By applying the same procedure as in the previous case, we end up
with the Taylor principle:
 > 1: (65)
Notice that (58) and (60) identify negative thresholds, hence they are always nested in condition
(65). Therefore they are discarded. To sum up:
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 I¤  >  then the relevant conditions are:
 (   1)
 (    ) > ;
 ( + 1)
 (   ) > :
As we know that under this assumption that  >  :
 (   1)
(    ) <
 (1 + )
 (   ) :
The only binding condition is (57): ( 1)(  ) = b > 
 I¤  <  then both of conditions (58 and 60) are already nested in  > 1:
 I¤  >  2 then for condition (63) < e = 2(1+)+(+)((1+2 ) ) :
 I¤  <  2 then for condition (65)
 =  > 1:
Proof Corollary 3 Proof. Notice that  always represents the minimum response thresh-
old on the relevant interval for the pass-through. Alternatively, conditions (29) and (30) repre-
sent a maximum response threshold. The conditions reported in Proposition 2 are considered in
the f;  g space. Notice that all of them can be written as  Q f
 
  1

. Under this assump-
tion, these conditions generally behave as hyperbolae in the relevant space. As we search for a
maximum response threshold, we are interested in the functions lying on the right hand side of
the asymptote of each curve. In this region all conditions are strictly decreasing functions.
The following inequality always holds:  2 <

 . Thus (30) will be binding rst from the
left. For    two conditions have to be fullled to ensure determinacy. We know that, for
 >  , if we compare conditions (29) and (59) the following inequality always holds:
(   1)
(    ) <
 (1 + )
 (   ) :
All we have to do now is to compute the value of  where conditions (29) and (30) cross at
the point e = b:
 =
 (1  ) +   1 + + 3 + 1 
 + 4 + 
:
We now have to compute the last threshold for the pass-through parameter above which de-
terminacy is never attained. This occurs at b =  = 1. Straightforward computation shows
that:
 =


  (   1)

:
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Proof Proposition 4 Proof. As the central bank does respond nor to asset prices mis-
alignments neither to output gap,  is one of the three eigenvalues of Jf . Furthermore the
NK Phillips curve and the IS constitute an autonomous system where the matrix of structural
parameters associated to the forward looking vector is represented by the following cofactor:
Jf33 =
"
 +  ( + 1)   (   1) ( + )  ( + )
  1 (   1) 1
#
:
Under a forward looking interest rate rule the necessary and su¢ cient conditions guaranteeing
determinacy can be stated as follows:
jBf j < 1; (66)
jAf j < 1 +Bf ; (67)
where Af and Bf are the coe¢ cients of the characteristic polynomial associated to Jf33:
2 +Af+Bf = 0;
where
Af =


(   1) ( + )   ( + 1)     1

Bf =  +  ( + 1)
Let us focus rst on condition (66):
j +  ( + 1)j < 1;
which translates into:
 +  ( + 1) < 1; (68)
     ( + 1) < 1: (69)
Let us consider rst condition (68). This inequality can be written as:
 <
1  
 ( + 1)
: (70)
Let us consider then condition (69):
 ( + 1) >  1  :
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Under  >  1 this can be expressed as:
 >
 1  
 ( + 1)
: (71)
In the remainder we will notice that, being this threshold always negative, (71) is fully encom-
passed by  > 1. Let us now focus on condition (67):


(   1) ( + )   ( + 1)     1 < 1 +  +  ( + 1) ; (72)


(   1) ( + )   ( + 1)     1 >  1      ( + 1) : (73)
We rst consider condition (72). After some rearrangements this can be written as:


1 +



  2 ( + 1)

< 2 + 2 + + 


:
Now we have to divide each side of then inequality by the term 
 
1 + 
  2 ( + 1) : This is
always be positive for:
 <
   
2
:
If we assume that the condition above holds we can determine the following constraint for the
response coe¢ cient:
 <
2 + 2 + +  

 
1 + 
  2 ( + 1) : (74)
Otherwise, when  >  2 :
 >
2 + 2 +  + 

 
1 + 
  2 ( + 1) : (75)
Next lets consider condition (73). This leads to:
 > 1 (76)
Notice that the threshold expressed in condition (75) is negative and thus completely nested in
(76).
Proof Corollary 5 Proof. Proposition 4 identies three relevant conditions. We rst
have to compute the points where conditions (34) and (35) cross condition (33). It can easily
be conrmed that condition (35) crosses condition (33) at:
 =
 1     

; (77)
and that condition (34) crosses condition (33) at:
 =
1     

: (78)
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Notice that (77) is always less than -1 and lies on the left of (78). Moreover, as (35) is
increasing in  it will always constitute an upper bound to the maximum  from  =  1 up
to the point where the conditions (34) and (35) cross each other:
 =
(1  ) ( + )
4 +  ( + )
  1: (79)
It also has to be conrmed that point (79) is on the left hand side of the asymptote of
condition (34), namely  2 . After some tedious algebra it can be proved that this is always
the case (under the parameter restrictions outlined). From  equal to (79) condition (34) binds
from above until the point where it crosses condition (33), at (78). From this point onwards
determinacy can never be attained.
